

TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

1. Events of last week proved not only the vulnerability of certain Afghan institutions but highlighted to an embarrassing degree the utter unreliability, impracticality and unworthiness of our so-called F&E radio network. It is pre-transistor, old fashioned, jury rigged, worn out, washed up and must be junked and replaced - NOW.

2. We have learned a lesson the hard way. Here we were, in a remote region of planet earth, in the middle of a coup and unable to communicate one with another. The first thing the coupsters did was to disconnect the telephone system (for six days). Simultaneously they shut down the telegraphic system. Then they closed the airport. Had it not been for our telecommunications network we would have been totally ineffective.

3. What we experienced during those seven days is really nothing new. At least since last August, radio voice communications at Kabul has been a sometimes thing. Since the first threat against

Department of State

86 D 416
1341083

CREATED
COLLECTED
CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
JUL 26 1973
5545

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/AMB

DISTRIBUTION
AMC
DIA
AMNH
DAO
CRO
CRU

ACTION: SecState WASHDC
INFO: Embassy, BEIRUT

KABUL: 5545

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ACOM, ASDC, AEMR, AFSP, AF
SUBJECT: KABUL'S E2E RADIO NET

REVIEWED BY: [Signature]
MESSAGE: [Signature]
() PRECISE () ETC PART 7
() DEITY () I.E. E.O.
EOL EO OF PA [Signature]
() CLASSIFY TO: [Signature]
() DOWNGRADE IS TO () S or () C, OADR

DEPT FOR STEA/EX FOR HUNT, SY FOR GENTILE, OPN/HIS FLR McDONNELL.
CC FOR NAHER
BEIRUT FOR REQ

1. Events of last week proved not only the vulnerability of certain Afghan institutions but highlighted to an embarrassing degree the utter unreliability, impracticality and unworthiness of our so-called E2E radio network. It is pre-transistor, old fashioned, jury rigged, worn out, washed up and must be junked and replaced - NOW.
2. We have learned a lesson the hard way. Here we were, in a remote region of planet earth, in the middle of a coup and unable to communicate one with another. The first thing the coupsters did was to disconnect the telephone system (for six days). Simultaneously they shut down the telegraphic system. Then they closed the airport. Had it not been for our telecommunications network we could have been totally ineffective.
3. What we experienced during those seven days is really nothing new. At least since last August, radio voice communications at Kabul has been a precarious thing. Since the first threat against

DRAFTED BY: [Signature]
ADMIN: PIKELEY-gar
CLEAN: [Signature]
DATE: 7/26/73
46
ADMIN OFF: [Signature]

ATTACH: COL STATION [Signature]
A/DCM: DECOM [Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

the Ambassador in December 1972 we have tried to revive our emphyneumatic F&E radio net. In the great tradition of the service we have tried, as usual parsimoniously, to/ do and muddle through. We even had a radio expert over from Delhi once! All this patchwork effort on our so-called F&E net has only perpetuated an unreliable useless system and in the process allowed a mesmerizing tendency to exist giving us a false sense of security which in the bright light of last week's reality could have been serious or even fatal.

4. On the other hand, the USAID net (separate from ours) is alive and well, thank God. Had it not been for its excellence and relative platitude we would have been, Sirs, up the creek without a paddle in a leaky canoe had events moved differently than they had.

5. We are in your hands. We will accept the sagacious judgement of the Department as what kind of new and modern equipment is best and called for. Please accept our judgement, therefore, that this is what we need.

A. Base Stations, - five (5): Chancery, USAID, USIS,

Peace Corps, Residence.

B. Repeater unit/sites: one or more.

C. Mobile units - thirteen (13): Vehicles of Ambassador, DGM, DATT, ATRA, Medical Doctor, all pooled vehicles and SY officer's personal car.

D. Portable PR-36 units: Seventy one (71): AMB, DCM, USAID (4), POL (5), CCON, DAT (4), PAO (2), ADMIN, GSO, SY, DUTY OFFICER, DUTY SECRETARY, DUTY CRU, DUTY TOU, HOSPITAL (4), PC (2), CONSUL, DEA/ATT, MARINE HOUSE (2), NE NCOIC, D&E WARDENS (25), SPARES (10).

E. One real livewire American radio technician who would know how to maintain the above equipment. (Perhaps on military complement).

6. We have no means to fund the above request. In view of our experience last week and the still unsettled situation, can this be immediately funded from "Emergencies in the Diplomatic and consular Service" a proportion of this is a real emergency.

7. [3 words illeg]

4. On the other hand, the WALL net (separate from WALL) in silver and red, thank God, WALL is not seen for its excellence and relative slenderness we could have seen, first, up the creek without a paddle in a leaky canoe and events moved differently than they had.

5. We are in your hands. We will accept the merciful judgment of the Department as to what kind of new and modern equipment is best and called for. Please accept our judgment, therefore, that this is what we need.

- A. Base Stations - Five (5). Chancery, CSAID, DTR, Police Corps, Resident.
- B. Repeater unit/sites: one or more.
- C. Mobile units - Thirteen (13). Vehicles of Ambassador, PM, DMR, Army Medical Doctor, all pooled vehicles and SY officer's personal car.
- D. Portable Radios - Twenty-one (21). AMR, ACM, DMRT (4), PDR (1), DRP, DRI (1), PAB (2), ADMIR, FPD, SY OFFICER'S PERSONAL RADIO, UNIT TWO, UNIT FOUR, UNIT SIX AND SEVEN, UNIT EIGHT, UNIT NINE, UNIT TEN, UNIT ELEVEN, UNIT TWELVE, UNIT THIRTEEN, UNIT FOURTEEN, UNIT FIFTEEN, UNIT SIXTEEN, UNIT SEVENTEEN, UNIT EIGHTEEN, UNIT NINETEEN, UNIT TWENTY.